




ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING CHANGE
By Michal Matejka and Anja De Waegenaere
July 2000
ISSN 0924-7815Organizational Design and
Management Accounting Change
Michal Matµ ejka¤ Anja De Waegenaerey
June, 1999
Abstract
Changing management accounting systems requires more than appropriate
implementation. It is argued that structural characteristics of an organization,
centralization in particular, should also be taken into account when deciding
on a change. Centralization implies higher costs of communication because the
decision-maker has to obtain information from organizational participants who
have incentives to in‡uence the decision. A limit on communication reduces
in‡uence costs but at the same time it also lowers the quality of the decision.
As a result of that, centralized organizations (i) will implement changes in
their accounting systems less often than decentralized ones (ii) will more often
implement top-down, i.e. ignore local information.
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11 Introduction
This study contributes to the literature that seeks to understand when and why
organizations introduce changes in their management accounting systems (MAS).
In prior work addressing the question, two domains have been prominent - technical
merit of a particular technique (e.g., Bankerand Hughes, 1994, Banker and Johnston,
1993) and implementation issues (e.g., Foster and Swenson, 1997, Shields, 1995).
We emphasize the importance of an additional domain and argue that organi-
zational design has implications for changing MAS of a …rm. Organizational de-
sign implies a …rm speci…c distribution of incentives, information and decision rights
(Zimmerman, 1997). These structural factors are potentially the major cause of or-
ganizational resistance to a MAS change. Implementation process factors (e.g., clear
objectives, training of users) may play a secondary role. Adequate implementation
may alleviate resistance but cannot remove the underlying structural cause (Markus
and Pfe¤er, 1983). Recent empirical research provides evidence that is in line with
this argument (Anderson and Young, 1999; Gosselin, 1997).
We model the e¤ect of centralization1 - one of the key organization design factors-
on the process of MAS change. Centralization has probably been the most prominent
structural factor in the empirical work studying MAS design and changes (Gosselin,
1997; Libby and Waterhouse, 1996; Gul and Chia, 1994; Chenhall and Morris, 1986).
Additionally, there is extensive theoretical work on centralization (Aghion and Tirole,
1997; Baiman and Rajan, 1995; Melumad and Reichelstein, 1987) highlighting its
importance in organizational design.
The decision to adopt and implement a MAS change is analyzed in a framework
drawing on the lobbying literature (Che and Gale, 1998). The decision-maker has to
obtain information on the value of the MAS change from organizational participants
who will be a¤ected by the change. Communication with them is both costly and in-
1In line with the literature, we de…ne centralization as the extent to which authority is con…ned
to higher levels of the hierarchy. Decentralization entails delegation of authority.
2formative. The communication costs in centralized organizations, where the distance
between the decision-maker and those who have the information is larger, are higher
than in decentralized organizations. Given thisassumption, we derive thatcentralized
organizations will optimally implement fewer MAS changes and implement top-down
(ignoring local information) more often than decentralized organizations.
The rest of this section provides more detail and an example of the problem we
want to address. In subsection 1.1, we argue that an important distinction between
centralized and decentralized structures arises due to communication costs. Subsec-
tion 1.2 shows that MAS change will give rise to extraordinary communication costs
due to in‡uencing activities. Section 2 presents a model that captures the core of
the problem and section 3 derives implications of the model. We discuss them and
conclude in the last section.
1.1 Centralization and costs of communication
Centralization implies communication costs because knowledge has to be transferred
to the person who has decision rights. Under decentralization the decision rights are
transferred to the person who has the knowledge, which gives rise to agency costs
(Christie et al., 1992). The trade-o¤ between agency and communication costs deter-
mines the optimal level of centralization. A key insight of the theoretical literature
is that when the revelation principle (Myerson, 1982) applies, a centralized structure
will always (at least weakly) outperform delegation in solving the agency problems
(Melumad etal., 1997). Within that framework, one cannot explain why delegation is
such a common arrangement in practice. That is why recent theories depart from the
assumptions of the revelation principle. The assumption of costless communication
seems to be an obvious target. Melumad et al. (1997, 1992) solve the incentive prob-
lem with an exogenous restriction on communication and contracting. They show
that when communication is limited, delegation dominates centralization.
Similarly, the starting point of our analysis is that communication costs can be
3reduced by delegation of authority. Rather than looking for the optimal degree of
centralization, our study points out the implications of di¤erent degrees of central-
ization for the process of MAS change. The interesting aspect of the question is
that we can no longer assume that communication is a routine information exchange.
MAS themselves are the routine information technology, that’s why any MAS change
will be a special event with a nontrivial communication problem. The next section
describes it in more detail.
1.2 MAS change and Cost of Communication
MAS are an established information technology and there are multiple users of MAS
output. Consequently, MAS design is a result of compromising di¤erent information
demands. In our setting, it is important to recognize that managers at higher levels
of a hierarchy will have di¤erent information needs than managers at lower levels.
The following example based on a real problem of a company2 illustrates the con‡ict
that arises when a MAS change is considered.
A large multinational …rm producing consumer goods has several operating
companies in most major European markets. The …rm focuses on a single line
of business but production lists of its companies di¤er widely. Each company
produces a di¤erent number of products and has a di¤erent mixture of local
and European brands.
The …rm was concerned with production e¢ciency in some companies and
planned to reorganize the production of its European brands. The …rm launched
a …rm-wide benchmarking program. To be able to rely on accurate products
cost information, the …rm decided to implement activity-based costing (ABC)
in all of its companies. The ABC project met with resistance in some com-
panies. They argued that ABC will not bring anything to them because they
either produce very few product items (i.e. cost allocations are not a major
issue) or focus mainly on local brands that will not be a¤ected by the reorgani-
zation. Still, to assure comparability of cost information, these companies were
asked to switch to the ABC system.
2Its name and further details are con…dential and cannot be presented here.
4The example illustrates the need for comparable cost information at higher man-
agement levels. It also points out that local information needs are company-speci…c
(dependent on cost structure, product portfolio) and have to be compromised some-
times.
Many MAS changes are likely to be subject to a similar con‡ict. On the one
hand, there is the essential demand of high level managers for uniformity of MAS,
on the other, there are speci…c needs of local users whose opinions on a MAS change
may di¤er greatly. Preserving the uniformity of MAS requires that bene…ts from a
change for some users be traded-o¤ against costs that the change imposes on others.
Moreover, only users themselves know the magnitude of these bene…ts or costs. This
is why the previous section described MAS changesasspecial eventswith anon-trivial
communication problem. The decision-maker has to obtain information from parties
whowill be a¤ected by the decision. Milgrom(1988) and Milgromand Roberts (1988)
point out that this creates incentives for in‡uence activities.
There are several analytical structures that model in‡uence activities within an
organization3. Moreover, the problemof information exchange with interested parties
has been dealt with in the lobbying literature (e.g., Lohmann, 1995; Potters and Van
Winden, 1992 ). A large partof this work (e.g., Che and Gale, 1998; Baye etal., 1993)
applies analytical models that are closely related to auction theory (e.g., La¤ont and
Robert, 1996; Amann and Leininger, 1996). The common feature of this literature is
a setting in which two or more agents compete forone good. The core problemis how
to design a mechanism that would be optimal given the preferences of the mechanism
designer. As the lobbying literature points out, the same problem occurs when a
decision that a¤ects the utility of the agents is to be taken. They have an incentive
to spend resources on in‡uencing the decision, which may be socially wasteful.
3Schae¤er (1998) applies the concept of in‡uence costs to organizational change, Rottenberg and
Saloner (1995) model the interfunctional con‡ict within organizations, Bagwell and Zechner (1993)
and Meyer et al. (1992) analyze the relationship between headquarters and divisions and divestiture
activities.
5We apply these insights to learn more about the organizational process of MAS
change. Besides that, we contribute to the underlying analytical literature in two
ways. First, we extend the framework analyzing the e¤ect of a limit on the lobbyists’
contributions (Che and Gale, 1998). In our model, it is possible to derive the optimal
limit endogenously by explicitly modeling the preferences and information of the
decision-maker. Second, drawing on the in‡uence cost literature, we …nd a way
to incorporate information bene…ts of lobbying into the widely used auction-based
models.
2 Analytical Framework
This section presents the analytical framework we use to address the research ques-
tion: what is the e¤ect of centralization on the process of MAS change. Subsection
2.1 discusses the assumptions of our model, which we describe in more detail in sub-
sections 2.2, 2.3 and present its equilibrium in 2.4. Finally, we check the robustness
of the results by modifying the information structure of the model in subsection 2.5.
2.1 Assumptions
The assumptions below underlie the analysis:
Assumption 1. The impact of a MAS change is not distributed evenly across
departments in a …rm.
Decision-making bene…ts from any accounting change are situation speci…c. They
depend on factors that vary across departments, such as cost structure, management
style, etc. Hence, we can assume that MAS change would increase pro…ts in one
department, while it would not be worth the costs in another.
Assumption 2. It is not possible to restrict implementation to only those de-
partments that can bene…t from the MAS change.
6Whenever there are multiple business units (functional departments) in a …rm,
MAS uniformity becomes an essential prerequisite for planning and control. Perfor-
mance measures, benchmarkingorlimited processingcapacity at higherlevelsrequires
standardization of internal reporting and MAS practices. The accounting literature
provides numerous examples of situations when corporate headquarters imposed an
accounting technique on the divisions, even though itlimited theirability to use MAS
as a support for local decision-making (Jones, 1992; Colignon and Covaleski, 1988;
Jones, 1985). Therefore we assume that MAS changes cannot be implemented only
in the business units (functional departments) that can bene…t from it.
Assumption 3. The degree of centralization and compensation are not adjusted
to re‡ect speci…c circumstances of a MAS change.
Anderson and Young (1999) and Shields (1995) …nd that performance evaluation
and compensation are not altered to create a link with ABC implementation. We
suggest the following explanation. Compensation and delegation of authority are
essential building blocks of organizational design. These building blocks are put in
place for along period of time and require stability (Foster and Ward, 1994). Altering
them to address short term issues, such as MAS change implementation, would have
adverse long term consequences. Thus, we assume that the design elements are
una¤ected by a particular MAS change. This does not preclude the possibility that
they were ex-ante chosen in a way that re‡ected the expected impact of future MAS
changes.
Assumption 4. Transfer of knowledge from the agents to the principal is more
costly in a more centralized environment.
In a decentralized organization, the decision-maker is close to the people who
possess relevant information. It is relatively inexpensive to obtain it as the decision-
maker has enough knowledge to understand the information, and recognize that it is
7relevant and true. In centralized organizations, decision rights are located at higher
organizational levels. The distance between the decision-maker and the level where
information is present becomes larger. As a consequence, lower level managers have
to report the information through a more costly process. This observation is in line
with McAfee and McMillan (1995), and Jensen and Meckling (1992).
2.2 Basic Model
To address our research question, we model the interactions of a principal and two
agents. The principal (she) is the decision-maker who is responsible for MAS design.
The agents are two competing departments within the …rm. Agent 1 (he) is in favor
of the change, agent 2 (he) is against it (assumption 1 and 2). Each agent knows
what the change implies for his department’s contribution to …rm’s pro…tability, µi
(i = 1; 2). Let µ1 be the increase in the pro…t of agent’s 1 department due to the
change and µ2 the decrease in the pro…t of agent’s 2 department (the costs of the
change are higher than its bene…ts for this department). For the principal, µi is a
realization of £i, a stochastic variable with auniformdistribution on the interval [0,1].
£1 and £2 are independent. The agents may or may not have better information than
the principal about the opponent’s type. Therefore, we compare two complementary
cases. In what follows, we …rst assume that the agents know as much as the principal
about the opponent’s type, i.e. the distribution of £i only. Second, in section 2.5
we consider the case where the agents have perfect information about the opponent’s
type, while the principal still knows only the distribution of the types.
Following the empirical literature (Krumwiede, 1998; Gosselin, 1997), we distin-
guish two di¤erent stages of the change process: adoption and implementation. The
adoption stage refers to information gathering and evaluating whether the suggested
MAS change is suitable for the …rm. During the implementation stage the initial idea
of MAS change translates into its practical realization. Implementation is contingent
upon the information collected in the adoption stage. The principal decides …rst on
8adoption of the change:
A = 1; if the change is adopted,
= 0; if the change is not adopted. (1)
A positive adoption decision (A = 1) allows the agents to search for relevant informa-
tion and to present it to the principal. Depending on the information they provide
during this stage, the principal decides whether to implement. For A = 1, we de…ne:
I = 1; if the change is implemented,
= 0; if the change is not implemented. (2)
If I = 1; agent 1 can increase his department’s pro…t by µ1. If I = 0; agent 2
can prevent a decrease of µ2. Both agents can exert in‡uencing e¤ort e1 and e2 to
persuade the principal to make their favored decision. The in‡uencing e¤ort will
result into some departmental in‡uence costs, di(ei): To simplify notation, we assume
di(ei) = ei. Thus, the agent’s pay-o¤s are:
UA
1 (e1) = µ1 ¡e1; if I = 1
= ¡e1; if I = 0 ; U A
2 (e2) = ¡µ2 ¡e2; if I = 1
= ¡e2; if I = 0 (3)
Risk aversion is not central to our problem, therefore we assume that agents are risk
neutral, i.e. they maximize their expected pay-o¤ (see (12) in appendix). Note that
compensation does not a¤ect the agent’s pay-o¤s in the game as it is invariable in the
process of MAS change (assumption 3). An additional implicit assumption is that
the existing compensation plan provides incentives to maximize departmental pro…t.
The principal is also risk neutral, i.e. when making the adoption and implementa-
tion decisions, she maximizes expected …rm pro…ts. If she refuses to adopt the change
(A = 0), the game ends and all players receive zero as a payo¤. By adopting (A = 1),
the principal opens communication channels with the agents. Their in‡uencing ef-
forts are informative but also costly. The principal incurs …xed adoption costs, C
A.
Moreover, the agents’ in‡uencing e¤orts, ei (i = 1; 2), cause organizational in‡uence
costs, C(e1; e2; c): The parameterc re‡ectsthe degree ofcentralization. It is higher for
more centralized organizations (assumption 4). The principal can reduce C(e1; e2; c)
by approving a limited amount of time or money to be spent on searching for and
9presenting of information
4. Let us denote this limit on ei as L: (The in‡uencing e¤ort
is a function of the agents’ types and the limit, ei(µi; L): In what follows, ei denotes
also realizations of this function.)
After the adoption stage, the principal decides on implementation. She can revise
the adoption decision and reject the implementation (I = 0). If she implements, the
…rm’s pro…ts change by µ1 ¡µ2. Formally, her pay-o¤ is:
UP(A; I) = B(I) ¡C(e1; e2; c) ¡CA; if A = 1;
= 0; if A = 0; (4)
where B(I); MAS change value, and C(e1; e2; c); organizational in‡uence costs, are
de…ned as follows:
B(I) = µ1 ¡µ2; if I = 1;
= 0; if I = 0; (5)
C(e1;e2; c) = c(e1 +e2)
2: (6)
The de…nition of C(e1; e2;c) re‡ects that the in‡uencing e¤ort has di¤erent implica-
tions for an agent and for the principal, i.e. the …rm as a whole. As the total amount
of time spent on in‡uencing increases, negative externalities related to it accumulate
increasingly. Excessive in‡uencing results in a preoccupation with internal problems
and organizational politics, which is detrimental to the performance. Moreover, this
problemis especially severe forcentralized organizations(Milgromand Roberts, 1992;
Burns and Waterhouse, 1975), which is captured in the de…nition by c:
The in‡uencing e¤orts, ei; cause organizational in‡uence costs but reveal infor-
mation as well. Depending on his e¤ort, each agent produces some amount of mes-
sages, mi(ei), in favor or against the change. To simplify the problem, we assume
mi(ei) = ei. Thus, having observed e1 and e2 the principal can revise her expectations
of the MAS change value and, if necessary, revise the adoption decision.
4The idea of restricting in‡uencing e¤orts is similar to Milgrom and Roberts (1988) who argue
that a solution to avoid in‡uence costs is to close the communication channel.
102.3 Time line and solution concept
The previous section described the basic building blocks of the game. Here, we …rst
summarize it in a time line and then introduce the solution concept.
The principal The agents The principal
e1, e2 A, L I
Figure 1: Time line
Figure 1 depicts the timing of the moves in the game. Before the …rst move, £i
is assigned values of the agents’ types µi (i = 1; 2). The game proceeds as follows:
1) The principal decides on adoption of the change, A: She knows the distribution
of the agents’ types, £i, the …xed costs of adoption, CA, and the cost implications of
the agents’ in‡uencing e¤orts, C(e1;e2; c). If A = 0, the game ends. If A = 1, the
principal simultaneously chooses the limit L.
2) Having observed L, the agents simultaneously determine their in‡uencing e¤ort
e1 and e2. They know their own type and the distribution of the opponent’s type.
3) Having observed e1 and e2, the principal makes her …nal decision on implemen-
tation. She can revise her adoption decision and reject the change. All payo¤s are
realized and the game ends.
We can apply backward induction to solve the game. The principal’s implementa-
tion strategy in the third move depends on the agents’ strategies in the second move.
On the other hand, the agents’ strategies depend not only on the L chosen in the …rst
move but also on how the principal decides on the implementation in the third move.
In equilibrium, all players will correctly predict the optimal strategies of the other
parties. Therefore, we …rst look for a Baysian Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Mas-Colell
et al., 1995) of the subgame that consists of the second and third moves of the overall
game, given a …xed L: Second, knowing the equilibrium strategies of the principal
11and the agents given a …xed L, we look for the optimal L in the …rst move.
2.4 Results
Given that L was chosen in the …rst move, denote by I¤(L) the equilibrium imple-
mentation strategy of the principal in the third move: Further, denote e¤
i(L) as the
equilibrium in‡uencing e¤ort of the agents in the second move. It is a function of
both µi and L but we omit the former argument so as to save notation:
The following proposition describes the equilibrium strategies in the subgame
(moves 2, 3):
Proposition 1 Given a limit L on the agents’ in‡uencing e¤ort, the agents simul-





2 , if µi 2 [0;2L]; i = 1; 2;
= L; if µi 2 (2L; 1]:
(7)
Having observed e1 and e2 the principal will make the implementation decision in the
following way:
If e1 > e2, then I¤(L) = 1:
If e1 < e2, then I¤(L) = 0:
If e1 = e2, the principal randomizes, P(I¤(L) = 0) = P(I¤(L) = 1) =
1
2.
Proof. For a proof see appendix 5.1.
The agents face a trade-o¤. The in‡uencing e¤ort, ei, decreases their pay-o¤ but
increases the chances that they will persuade the principal to make their favored de-
cision I. Being a higher type results in higher in‡uencing e¤ort as the pay-o¤ from
persuading the principal (winning) increases. In equilibrium, the principal predicts
this behavior and infers from e1 > e2 (e1 < e2) that £1 > £2 (£1 < £2). All costs
are sunk at this stage, hence £1 > £2 (£1 < £2) implies a positive (negative) imple-
mentation decision. When e1 = e2, the principal is indi¤erent about implementation.
12The equilibrium requires that the principal can set the limit L credibly, and the
agentswill notignore it. Credibilityofthe principal’scommitmentisindeed a problem
in many settings where in‡uence costsoccur (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1995). Ex ante
commitment may notbe credible forthe principal if ex postthere are some convincing
arguments. Here, L represents a limit in terms of time or money the agents are given
to conduct search and present their results. When the time is over, or the allowed
budget is spent, the agents simply cannot search any further.
Proposition 1 allows us to analyze the optimization problem the principal faces in
the …rst move when she chooses the limit L. The lower the limit L, the lower are the
expected organizational in‡uence costs but the less information is revealed and the













CA are the …xed adoption costs. E[C(e¤
1(L);e¤
2(L); c)]; the expected organizational
in‡uence costs, follow directly from (6) and proposition 1 by integrating over all
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The function is increasing in L on the interval [0;
1
2]: Thus, the in‡uencing e¤orts
generate information bene…ts. We illustrate that with two extreme examples:
E[B(I¤(L))] = E[£1 ¡£2] = 0; if L = 0:
= E[(£1 ¡£2)1£1>£2] =
1
6; if L =
1
2:
5The notation E[(£1 ¡ £2)1A] stands for the expectation taken over all pairs µ1;µ2 for which A
is true.
13The principal will not implement when e1 < e2: She will infer that £1 < £2 and set
I
¤(L) = 0, by proposition 1. If L = 0, then e1 = e2 = 0; and the expectation is taken
over all realizations of £1 and £2. If L =
1
2, the principal can identify all the cases
where µ1 < µ2. This increases the expected MAS change value, because the pro…t
will not be negatively a¤ected by them.
Knowing how the expected MAS change value and the expected organizational
in‡uence costs depend on L allows us to solve the principal’s optimization problem
(8) and to state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The game of three players described in section 2.2 has a Baysian
Nash equilibrium consisting of the following strategies:
(1) The principal imposes the optimal limit L¤ and makes the adoption decision as
follows:
A¤ = 1; if E[B(I¤(L¤)) ¡C(e¤
1(L¤); e¤
2(L¤); c) ¡CA] > 0;
A
¤ = 0; otherwise.
(2) The agents and the principal play according to the strategies described in propo-
sition 1.
Proof. The proposition largely summarizes the preceding paragraphs. The optimal
adoption decision is straightforward. We omit the proof.
Before we look at the properties of this equilibrium, we consider a modi…cation
of the game.
2.5 The case of completely informed agents
The previous section considered the case where the agents do not have better in-
formation than the principal about the opponent’s type. When deciding on the
optimal in‡uencing e¤ort in the second move, they know only the distribution of £i:
In practice, it is conceivable that the manager of one department knows more than
the headquarters about the implications of a MAS change for another department.
Therefore, we also consider the complementary case of completely informed agents
14(who know both µ1 and µ2) in order to understand how the …ndings depend on the
assumed information structure.
The game remains virtually the same. The only thing that changes is that, in the
second move of the game, the agents simultaneously choose e1 and e2 knowing the
opponent’s type. Let µh = maxfµ1; µ2g and µl = minfµ1;µ2g, similarly for £i and ei:
We can state the following proposition which parallels proposition 1:
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1
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Having observed e1 and e2 the principal will make the implementation decision, I¤(L);
in the same way as described by proposition 1.
Proof. For the proof of the …rst part of the proposition see Che and Gale (1998)6.
The second partconcernsthe optimal implementation strategy. I
¤(L) doesnotchange
because it still holds that:
e1 > e2 ) E[£1 ¡£2 j e¤
l (L);e¤
h(L)] > 0;
e1 < e2 ) E[£1 ¡£2 j e¤
l (L);e¤
h(L)] < 0;
which can be veri…ed by applying the results for the individual in‡uencing strategies
in Che and Gale (1998).
The fact that the agents know their types forces them to randomize when the
limit is su¢ciently high. For simplicity, we do not reproduce the individual mixed
strategies, only their sum which is su¢cient to calculate the expected organizational
in‡uence costs.
The expected MAS change value is also di¤erent under the new information struc-
ture. Due to randomization, it may happen with a small probability that e1 < e2
(e1 > e2), although µ1 > µ2 (µ1 < µ2). As a result of that the information bene-
…ts from in‡uencing decrease. We omit the explicit expressions for E[B(I
¤(L))] and
6There are multiple equilibria in the case L = µl
2 : This occurs with zero probability and can be





2(L); c)] as they add little beyond what was presented in the previous
section. The new optimal limit ~ L
¤ follows from (8). It is di¤erent from L
¤, but all
the qualitative conclusions presented in the next section hold under both information
structures.
3 Implications for Adoption and Implementation
The previous sections derived the optimal trade-o¤ between costs and bene…ts of the
in‡uencing e¤ort. Itcan be used to generate insightsabout the e¤ect of centralization
on the adoption and implementation of a MAS change. The optimal limit will depend
on the degree of centralization. It will be denoted in this section as L
¤(c) and in the
case of complete information as ~ L¤(c): All properties of the function L¤(c) derived
below hold also for ~ L¤(c):
Proposition 4 The expected value of a MAS change in centralized organizations will
be lower than the expected value of the same MAS change in decentralized organiza-
tions.
Proof. Solving the optimization problem (8) yields the function L
¤(c): It can eas-
ily be verifed that
@L¤(c)
@c < 0 (recall that the parameter c is high for centralized
organizations). It follows from (9) that
@E[B(I¤(L))]
@L > 0.
This proposition points out an important …nding of this study. Organizational
in‡uence costs have both a direct and an indirect negative e¤ect. While the direct
costs of in‡uencing activities can be restricted, this will only be at the price of loos-
ing information for the decision making process. The next proposition shows the
implications for the adoption decision.
Proposition 5 Centralized organizations will optimallyadopt less MAS changes than
a decentralized organizations.
16Proof. Take any two values of parameter c, (e.g. ¯ c for a centralized organization
and c
¯
for a decentralized organization), such that ¯ c > c
¯
: Let C
A, the …xed costs of
adoption, depend on the type of MAS change that is considered for adoption. It can





























the following is true:
E[U
P(L





Consequently, A¤ = 0 for the centralized organization and A¤ = 1 for the decentral-
ized organization.
Considering any particular MAS change, there is always some chance that CA is
such that the change will be adopted in a decentralized organization but rejected in
an organization with a higher degree of centralization. In other words, centralized
organizations are less likely to adopt changes in their MAS.
Further, our analysis has implications for the implementation process. When
e1 6= e2, the principal decides on implementation after having obtained all the relevant
information from the agents. If e1 = e2 = L
¤(c), the decision to implement is based
on randomization. Such an implementation process can then be characterized as top-
down because it does not re‡ect the relevant information available at lower levels. It
would be too costly to obtain it.
Proposition 6 Centralized organizations that adopt a change are more likely to im-
plement it top-down, without obtaining all the information available at lower levels in
the organization.
Proof. Denote p(c) the probability that e¤
1 = e¤
2 = L¤(c): As
@L¤(c)
@c < 0; it can easily
be veri…ed that p(¯ c) > p(c
¯
) under both information structures.
17The conditional probability of implementation, given thatadoption occurred, does
not vary with the degree ofcentralization. Whatdi¤ers is the way the implementation
decision is made. In centralized organizations, it will frequently happen that MAS
change is implemented top-down without knowing whether the bene…ts are higher
than the costs of the MAS change.
Although we do not model the implementation stage explicitly (to avoid an overly
complex setting), we can speculate under what conditions centralized organizations
would be more likely to complete implementation once a MAS change was adopted
(Gosselin, 1997). Shifts in the environment can cause the agents’ types, µi; to ran-
domly change afterthe implementation decision (e.g. when anewpressingissue arises,
the opportunity costsofMAS change increase). The equilibriumofthismodi…ed game
would closely parallel our results because all the parties are risk neutral. The di¤er-
ence is that implementing MAS change with communication channels closed ignores
signals about increased costs of MAS. It will happen less often that MAS change
implementation is halted due to shifts in the environment. Thus, centralized orga-
nizations in a changing environment would be more likely to …nish implementation,
once it started.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Recent literature in organizational economics has addressed implications of in‡uence
costs for organizational design (see footnote 2). In this study, we have used these
insights to look at the implications for an organizational change process. We have
applied them to the process of management accounting change because it is a prime
example of change involving two features central to the analysis: a decision-maker
not informed about local information needs, and competition among the informed
parties. This is due to the con‡ict inherent in the functioning of MAS, given that it
is used both for control and decision-making.
Our …ndings suggest that the adoption and implementation process of a MAS
18change will di¤er among organizations with di¤erent degrees of centralization. Op-
timal change process for centralized organizations encompasses two features. First,
there will be a relatively high threshold that expected pro…t fromMAS change has to
meet. Below the threshold, change will not even be considered and no further infor-
mation will be sought (i.e. project will not even reach the adoption stage). Second,
top-down implementation will be relied upon more frequently, even though this may
sometimes lead to implementation of an undesirable change.
There are also limitations to the generalizibility of our results. First, we have
assumed that there are two organizational groups, one opposing, one supporting the
change. We can expect that this will mostly be the case, but it is not di¢cult to
imagine MAS changes that will not be too controversial. The key trade-o¤ analyzed
in our framework would not apply to these cases.
The second limitation comes from the fact that the only means of information
transmission in our analysis is competition between agents. Although Milgrom and
Roberts (1992) suggested that ”competition among interested parties with opposing
interests may o¤er the best chance for all the relevant facts and desirable alternatives
to be e¤ectively advocated”, our conceptualization of such an information revelation
might be too restrictive. We do not allow for the possibility that one of the parties
…nds a crucial piece of information with little e¤ort. More (better) evidence can only
be presented to the principal through more search e¤ort (mi(ei) = ei).
Notwithstanding these limitations, there are studies whose …ndings validate our
results. Zaltman et al. (1973) present, and the innovation literature frequently apply,
the ”ambidextrous model” of innovation which suggests that low formalization and
low centralization facilitate the initiation of innovations. The opposite structure is
instrumental in the implementation stage. Gosselin (1997) found that the degree of
centralization has a signi…cant e¤ect on what level of activity management is adopted
and then implemented. In his study, he distinguisheslessformal and lesssophisticated
levels (activity and cost driver analysis) and then the full formal ABC. Vertically
19di¤erentiated companies were found to adopt the full ABC system rather than the
simpler activity analysis. Even more interestingly, when centralized organizations
adopted ABC, they also went on with the implementation, while the decentralized
organizations would often stop the implementation process at some activity analysis
level (i.e., deviate from the original plan).
Our …ndings also shed some light on the developments in management account-
ing practices in the past. It has often been argued that management accounting
is lagging behind developments in the production environment. Martinez and Jar-
illo (1989) provide evidence that the degree of centralization di¤ers across functional
areas and that the …nance function is more centralized than other parts of the orga-
nization. Whether the same applies to MAS design still needs to be tested. But if
the accounting department is more centralized than others, then it is in line with our
theory that MAS are relatively rigid and it takes a major innovation such as ABC
for changes to occur on a large scale.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove that I
¤(L) as described in the proposition is optimal for the principal
given that the agents’ strategies are (7).
Given L; the principal will maximize E[U P(1;I)], her expected pay-o¤, when
making the implementation decision:
I
¤(L) = argmax
I=0;1 E[B(I) ¡C(e1; e2;c) ¡C
A j e
¤
1(L) = e1; e
¤
2(L) = e2]: (11)
From (5) we know that:




P(1; 0)] = E[¡C(e1;e2;c) ¡C
A j e
¤
1(L) = e1; e
¤
2(L) = e2]:
We can see that all the costs incurred in the adoption process are sunk and do not
in‡uence the decision.
E[UP(1;1)] ¸ E[UP(1; 0)] , E[£1 ¡£2 j e¤
1(L) = e1; e¤
2(L) = e2] ¸ 0:
20Knowing (7) and having observed e1 > e2; the principal can infer that £1 > £2:
Consequently:
e1 > e2 ) E[£1 ¡£2 j e¤
1(L) = e1; e¤
2(L) = e2] > 0
) E[UP(1; 1)] > E[UP(1; 0)]
) I¤(L) = 1:
Equivalent argument yields that e1 < e2 implies I¤(L) = 0. Finally:
e1 = e2 ) E[£1 ¡£2 j e1(£1;L) = e1; e2(£2;L) = e2] = 0
) E[UP(1; 1)] = E[U P(1;0)]
The principal is indi¤erent and any randomization is possible. Yet, as we show below,
only randomization with probability
1
2 can be maintained in the equilibrium.
Secondly, we prove that given I
¤(L); the agents will …nd it optimal to choose the
strategies as in (7). This part of the proposition was proved in a general form by
La¤ont and Robert (1996). Here, we present a simple proof for our speci…c case.
Without loss of generality we derive the optimal strategy of agent 1, given that
(7) is optimal for agent 2. He maximizes his expected pay-o¤:
E[U
A
1 (e1)] = P1(I
¤(L) = 1)µ1 ¡e1; (12)
where P1(I¤(L) = 1) is the agent’sinterim probability of winningre‡ecting his private
information µ1. Given that e1 2 [0; L] and agent 2 chooses his strategy in line with
(7); we can specify the probability of winning:
P1(I¤(L) = 1) = P1(e2 < e1) +
1
2P1(e2 = e1 = L)
= P1((£2 <
p
2e1) \ (£2 ￿ 2L)) +
1
2P1(£2 > 2L)1e1=L:
The second expression on the right-hand side is the probability that both agents
in‡uence L and the principal randomizes, i.e. the agent has
1
2 chance of winning.





2e1µ1 ¡e1; if e1 ￿ 2L
2 (13)
= 2Lµ1 ¡e1; if 2L2 < e1 < L; (14)
=
2L+1
2 µ1 ¡L; if e1 = L: (15)
21First, compare (13) and (14). It is never optimal to in‡uence e1 2 (2L
2;L) because
additional e¤ort decreases pay-o¤ without increasing the probability of winning (no-
tice that for L 2 (0;
1
2) it is always true that 2L2 < L). Second, the …rst order
condition corresponding to (13) yields e1 =
µ2
1
2 . The highest expected pay-o¤ the







2 : Third, compare (13) and (15).
It can be easily veri…ed that for µ1 = 2L the agent can do equally well under (13)
and (15). For µ1 < 2L choosing e1 =
µ2
1
2 ; i.e. (13), is optimal. For µ1 > 2L choosing
e1 = L, i.e. (15), is optimal.
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